The social nature of abstract concepts: why when we think about fantasy and freedom we pre-activate the mouth

A joint team of Sapienza and Cnr has published a study on the elaboration of abstract concepts demonstrating the involvement of the motor system linked to linguistic production

The capacity to develop and use abstract concepts like “fantasy” and “freedom” is one of the most sophisticated capabilities of human beings, and distinguishes them from other primates.
A research team coordinated by Anna Borghi (Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy), together with Laura Barca and Luca Tummolini (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council - Cnr) and Ferdinand Binkofski (Aachen Hospital University, Germany) reports a number of studies demonstrating that processing of abstract concepts involves the motor system linked to linguistic production (mouth) more than processing of concrete concepts.Strikingly, the greater involvement of the mouth emerges when we simply think about abstract concepts, even when no verbal response is required by the experiment task.

“In order to understand a concept like chair - claims Anna Borghi - it is typically necessary to have experienced many chairs, while in order t o comprehend an abstract concept like freedom, that puts together a variety of heterogeneous experiences (e.g. running in a field, exiting a prison), the contribution of other people becomes paramount. As a consequence - Borghi continues - when we think about an abstract concept we re-enact the linguistic experience linked both to its acquisition and to the necessity to ask others the conceptual meaning. Thus we activate the mouth motor system more than for concrete concepts”.

The study, published on a special theme of the journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Science, reports the results of experiments performed on adult participants in a variety of tasks. For example, participants were required to press a button with the mouth or with the hand to evaluate concrete and abstract words. When the response was provided with the mouth, response times were faster with abstract than with concrete concepts, while concrete concepts were facilitated with manual responses. Other studies conducted with children indicate that limitating the facial-oral motility during the acquisition of social and linguistic competences can influence their way to represent abstract concepts.

The authors contend that this happens due to a mechanism they call “social metacognition”.
“Individuals are aware of the difficulties to use abstract concepts - explains Luca Tummolini of Cnr - and feel the need to turn to other individuals; the mouth activation would thus prepare them to ask information to others”.
Hence the formation of an extremely complex capability, such as that of using abstract concepts, is grounded on and benefits from the fundamentally social nature of our species.

This work develops and confirms what has been hypothesized on the basis of previous behavioral studies and studies conducted using fRMI and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS).
The article is part of a special issue, edited by the authors, entirely dedicated to abstract concepts. In the special issue it is demonstrated with a variety of tecniques and methodologies that the different kinds of abstract concepts (e.g. abstract concepts related to emotions, numbers, mental states, aesthetics and morality) are distributed and represented in different areas of the brain. Furthermore it is shown that, compared to concrete concepts, abstract concepts involve more inner processes (interoception, metacognition, emotion), and evoke more linguistic and social experiences.

References:
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Science Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use, and representation in the brain Anna M. Borghi, Laura Barca, Ferdinand Binkofski and Luca Tummolini - numero speciale

Abstract concepts, language and sociality: from acquisition to inner speech. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373, 20170134. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0134) Anna M. Borghi, Laura Barca, Ferdinand Binkofski and Luca Tummolini - articolo

Further Information
Anna Borghi - Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology
email: anna.borghi@uniroma1.it

Luca Tummolini - Institute of cognitive sciences and technologies (ISTC) 
email: luca.tummolini@istc.cnr.it

 

Monday, 18 June 2018

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